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Cooperation among unrelated individuals is frequently observed in social groups when their mem-
bers combine efforts and resources to obtain a shared benefit that is unachievable by an individual
alone. However, understanding why cooperation arises despite the natural tendency of individuals
towards selfish behavior is still an open problem and represents one of the most fascinating chal-
lenges in evolutionary dynamics. Recently, the structural characterization of the networks in which
social interactions take place has shed some light on the mechanisms by which cooperative behavior
emerges and eventually overcomes the natural temptation to defect. In particular, it has been found
that the heterogeneity in the number of social ties and the presence of tightly knit communities
lead to a significant increase in cooperation as compared with the unstructured and homogeneous
connection patterns considered in classical evolutionary dynamics. Here, we investigate the role of
social-ties dynamics for the emergence of cooperation in a family of social dilemmas. Social in-
teractions are in fact intrinsically dynamic, fluctuating, and intermittent over time, and they can
be represented by time-varying networks. By considering two experimental data sets of human
interactions with detailed time information, we show that the temporal dynamics of social ties has
a dramatic impact on the evolution of cooperation: the dynamics of pairwise interactions favors
selfish behavior.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 05.70.Fh, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
The organizational principles driving the evolution and
development of natural and social large-scale systems,
including populations of bacteria, ant colonies, herds of
predators, and human societies, rely on the cooperation
of large populations of unrelated agents [1–3]. Even if
cooperation seems to be a ubiquitous property of so-
cial systems, its spontaneous emergence is still a puz-
zle for scientists, since cooperative behaviors are con-
stantly threatened by the natural tendency of individuals
towards self-preservation and the never-ceasing competi-
tion among agents for resources and success. The pref-
erence for selfishness over cooperation is also due to the
higher short-term benefits that a single (defector) agent
obtains by taking advantage of the joint efforts of coop-
erating agents. Obviously, the imitation of such selfish
(but rational) conduct drives the system towards a state
in which the higher benefits associated with cooperation
are no longer achievable, with dramatic consequences for
the whole population. Consequently, the relevant ques-
tion to address is why cooperative behavior is so common
∗ gardenes@gmail.com
in nature and society, and what are the circumstances
and the mechanisms that allow it to emerge and persist.
In recent decades, the study of the elementary mecha-
nisms fostering the emergence of cooperation in popula-
tions subjected to evolutionary dynamics has attracted a
lot of interest in ecology, biology, and social sciences [4, 5].
The problem has been tackled through the formulation
of simple games that neglect the microscopic differences
among distinct social and natural systems, thus providing
a general framework for the analysis of evolutionary dy-
namics [6–8]. Most of the classical models studied within
this framework made the simplifying assumption that
social systems are characterized by homogeneous struc-
tures, in which the interaction probability is the same for
any pair of agents and constant over time [9]. However,
the theory of complex networks has proven this assump-
tion false for real systems, by revealing that most nat-
ural and social networks exhibit large heterogeneity and
non–trivial interconnection topologies [10–13]. It has also
been shown that the structure of a network has dramatic
effects on the dynamical processes taking place on it, so
that complex networks analysis has become a fundamen-
tal tool in epidemiology, computer science, neuroscience,
and social sciences [14–16].
The study of evolutionary games on complex topolo-
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2gies has led to a new way out for cooperation to survive in
some paradigmatic cases such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma
[17–20] or the Public Goods games [21–23]. In particu-
lar, it has been pointed out that the complex patterns of
interactions among the agents found in real social net-
works, such as scale-free distributions of the number of
contacts per individual or the presence of tightly-knit
social groups, tend to favor the emergence and persis-
tence of cooperation. This line of research, which brings
together the tools and methods from the statistical me-
chanics of complex networks and the classical models of
evolutionary game dynamics, has effectively became a
new discipline, known as evolutionary graph theory [24–
28].
Recently, the availability of longitudinal spatio-
temporal information about human interactions and so-
cial relationships [29–32] has revealed that social systems
are not static objects at all: contacts among individuals
are usually volatile and fluctuate over time [33, 34], face-
to-face interactions are bursty and intermittent [35, 36],
and agents motion exhibits long spatio-temporal correla-
tions [37–39]. Consequently, static networks, constructed
by aggregating in a single graph all the interactions ob-
served among a group of individuals across a given pe-
riod, can only be considered as simplified models of real
networked systems. For this reason, time-varying graphs
have been introduced recently as a more realistic frame-
work to encode time-dependent relationships [40–44]. In
particular, a time-varying graph is an ordered sequence
of graphs defined over a fixed number of nodes, where
each graph in the sequence aggregates all the edges ob-
served within a certain temporal interval. The introduc-
tion of time as a new dimension of the graph gives rise
to a richer structure. Therefore, new metrics specifically
designed to characterize the temporal properties of graph
sequences have been proposed, and most of the classical
metrics defined for static graphs have been extended to
the time-varying case [44–50]. Recently, the study of dy-
namical processes taking place on time-evolving graphs
has shown that temporal correlations and contact recur-
rence play a fundamental role in diverse settings such as
random walks dynamics [51–53], the spreading of infor-
mation and diseases [54–56], and synchronization [57].
Here we study how the level of cooperation is af-
fected when one considers a more realistic picture, in
which the interactions in a social system are repre-
sented by time-varying graphs instead of classical (static)
ones. We consider a family of social dilemmas, includ-
ing the Hawk-Dove, the Stag Hunt, and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma games, played by agents connected through a
time-evolving topology obtained from real traces of hu-
man interactions. We analyze the effect of temporal res-
olution and correlations on the emergence of coopera-
tion in two paradigmatic data sets of human proxim-
ity, namely the MIT Reality Mining [29] and the INFO-
COM’06 [30] co-location traces. We find that the level of
cooperation achievable on time-varying graphs depends
crucially on the interplay between the speed at which
the network changes and the typical time scale at which
agents update their strategy. In particular, cooperation
is facilitated when agents keep playing the same strategy
for longer intervals, while too frequent strategy updates
tend to favor defectors. Our results also suggest that
the presence of temporal correlations in the creation and
maintenance of interactions hinders cooperation, so that
synthetic time-varying networks in which link persistence
is broken usually exhibit a considerably higher level of co-
operation. Finally, we show that both the average size of
the giant component and the weighted temporal cluster-
ing calculated across different consecutive time windows
are indeed good predictors of the level of cooperation at-
tainable on time-varying graphs.
II. EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS ON
TIME-VARYING GRAPHS
A. Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas
We focus on the emergence of cooperation in systems
whose individuals face a social dilemma between two pos-
sible strategies: Cooperation (C) and Defection (D). A
large class of social dilemmas can be formulated as in
[18] via a two-parameter game described by the payoff
matrix:
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
=
(C D
C 1 S
D T 0
)
, (1)
where R, S, T , and P represent the payoffs corresponding
to the various possible encounters between two players.
Namely, when the two players choose to cooperate, they
both receive a payoff R = 1 (for Reward), while if they
both decide to defect they get P = 0 (for Punishment).
When a cooperator faces a defector it gets the payoff S
(for Sucker) while the defector gets T (for Temptation).
In this version of the game, the payoffs S and T are the
only two free parameters, and their respective values in-
duce an ordering of the four payoffs that determines the
type of social dilemma. We have in fact three different
scenarios. When T > 1 and S > 0, defecting against
a cooperator provides the largest payoff, and this corre-
sponds to the Hawk-Dove game. For T < 1 and S < 0,
cooperating with a defector is the worst case, and we
have the Stag Hunt game. Finally, for T > 1 and S < 0,
when a defector plays with a cooperator, we have at the
same time the largest (for the defector) and the smallest
(for the cooperator) payoffs, and the game corresponds
to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this work, we consider the
three types of games by exploring the parameter regions
T ∈ [0, 2] and S ∈ [−1, 1].
In real social systems, each individual has more than
one social contact at the same time. This situation
is usually represented [26] by associating each player
i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N to a node of a static network, with
adjacency matrix A = {aij}, whose edges indicate pairs
3FIG. 1. (Color online). Activity patterns of human interactions. The number Eactive of links in the graph at time t is reported
as a function of time for MIT Reality Mining (a) and INFOCOM’06 (b). Weekly and daily periodicities are visible. Red (light
gray) lines display the moving averages, over a 1-month and a 1-day windows, respectively, revealing the non-stationarity of
the sequences. Distributions of edge -active and -inactive periods (triangles and circles, respectively) for MIT Reality Mining
(c) and INFOCOM’06 (d). The data were log-binned. The peak at σ ∼ 1 for the inactive periods corresponds to 24 hours.
of individuals playing the game. In this framework, a
player i selects a strategy, plays a number of games equal
to the number of her neighbors, ki =
∑
j aij , and accu-
mulates the payoffs associated with each of these interac-
tions. Obviously, the outcome of playing with a neighbor
depends on the strategies selected by both players, ac-
cording to the payoff matrix in Eq. (1). When all the
individuals have played with all their neighbors in the
network, they update their strategies as a result of an
evolutionary process, i.e., according to the total collected
payoff. Namely, each individual i compares her cumu-
lated payoff, pi, with that of one of her neighbors, say
j, chosen at random. The probability Pi→j that agent i
adopts the strategy of her neighbor j increases with the
difference (pj−pi). Here we adopt the so-called Fermi up-
date [58, 59] in which the probability that agent i copies
the strategy of the randomly chosen neighbor j reads:
Pi→j =
1
1 + e−β(pj−pi)
, (2)
where β is a parameter controlling the smoothness of the
transition from Pi→j = 0 for small values of (pj − pi),
to Pi→j = 1 for large values of (pj − pi). Notice that
for β  1 we obtain Pi→j ' 0.5 regardless of the value
of (pj − pi), which effectively corresponds to a random
strategy update. On the other hand, when β  1 then
Pi→j ' Θ(pj − pi), where Θ(x) is the Heaviside step
function. Here we adopt β = 1, although we have checked
that the results are qualitatively similar for a broad range
of values of β.
The games defined by the payoff matrix in Eq. (1) and
the use of a payoff-based strategy update rule have been
thoroughly investigated in static networks with different
topologies. The main result is that, when the network is
fixed and agent strategies are allowed to evolve over time,
the level of cooperation increases with the heterogeneity
of the degree distribution of the network, with scale-free
networks being the most paradigmatic promoters of co-
operation [17–19]. However, in most cases human con-
tacts and social interactions are intrinsically dynamic and
varying in time, a feature that has profound consequences
on any process taking place over a social network. We
explore here the role of time on the emergence of coop-
eration in time-varying networks.
B. Temporal patterns of social interactions
In the following, we consider two data sets describ-
ing the temporal patterns of human interactions at two
different time scales. The first data set has been col-
lected during the MIT Reality Mining experiment [29],
and it includes information about the spatial proximity
of a group of students, staff, and faculty members at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, over a period of
six months. The resulting time-dependent network has
N = 100 nodes and consists of a time-ordered sequence
{G1, G2, . . . , GM} of M = 41291 graphs (snapshots),
each graph representing proximity interactions during a
time interval of τ = 5 minutes. Remember that each
graph Gm (m = 1, . . . ,M) accounts for all the instanta-
neous interactions taking place in the temporal interval
[(m−1)τ,mτ ]. The second data set describes co-location
patterns, over a period of four days, among the partici-
pants of the INFOCOM’06 conference [30]. In this case,
the resulting time-dependent network has N = 78 nodes,
and it contains a sequence of M = 2880 graphs obtained
by registering users co-location every τ = 2 minutes. Ad-
ditional details about the two data sets are reported in
Appendix A.
The frequency of social contacts is illustrated in Fig. 1
[panels (a) and (b)], where we report the number of active
links at time t, Eactive, as a function of time. In the MIT
Reality Mining data set, social activity exhibits daily
and weekly periodicities, respectively due to home–work
and working days-weekends cycles. In addition to these
rhythms, we notice a non-stationary behavior which is
clearly visible when we plot the activity averaged over a
1-month moving window [red line in panel (a)]. In the
4FIG. 2. (Color online). Cooperation diagrams for the MIT Reality Mining data set. Fraction of cooperators at the equilibrium
as a function of the temptation to defect (T) and of the sucker’s score (S) for different values of the interval ∆t between two
successive strategy updates. From left to right, the diagrams correspond to ∆t equal to 1 hour, 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 2
months, and to the entire observation period Mτ ' 5 months. The diagrams in the top row correspond to time-varying graphs
with original time ordering, those in the middle row are obtained for the same values of ∆t but on randomized time-varying
graphs, while the bottom row reports the results obtained on synthetic networks constructed through the activity-driven model.
The results are averaged over 50 different realizations. Red (light gray) corresponds to 100% of cooperators while blue (dark
gray) indicates 100% defectors. By focusing on a row, and proceeding from left to right, it is evident that there exists a value of
the update interval ∆t above which the differences in the cooperation diagram are mostly limited to the region which separates
the two phases (100% defectors and 100% cooperators), while the rest of the phase diagram is already indistinguishable from
that corresponding to the aggregate graph. Moreover, for a fixed value of ∆t, we observe that randomized and synthetic
sequences are associated with an overall larger level of cooperation than the original ones. See Fig. 8 for additional details.
INFOCOM’06 data set we observe a daily periodicity and
a non-stationary trend which is due, in this case, to a de-
creasing social activity in the last days of the conference
as seen by aggregating activity over 24 hours [red line
in panel (b)]. We also report in Fig. 1 [panels (c) and
(d)] the distributions P (σ) of contact duration, σ ≡ σon,
and of inter-contact time, σ ≡ σoff (i.e., the interval be-
tween two consecutive appearances of an edge). As it is
often the case for human dynamics [35], the distributions
of contact duration and inter-contact time are heteroge-
neous. For the MIT data set, an active edge can persist
up to an entire day, while inactive intervals can last over
multiple days and weeks; similar patterns are observed
in the INFOCOM’06 data set, where some edges remain
active up to one entire day and inter-contact times span
almost the whole observation interval. Edge activity ex-
hibits significant correlations over long periods of time.
In particular, the autocorrelation function of the time
series of edge activity shows a slow decay, up to lags of
6− 8 hours for the MIT data set, and of 3− 4 hours for
INFOCOM’06, after which the daily periodicity becomes
dominant (as displayed in Fig. 7).
III. EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN
TIME-VARYING NETWORKS
A. Cooperation Diagrams
To simulate the game on a time-varying topology
{Gm}m=1,...,M , we start from a random distribution of
strategies, so that each individual initially behaves either
as a cooperator or as a defector, with equal probability.
The simulation proceeds in rounds, where each round
consists of a playing stage followed by a strategy update.
In the first stage, each agent plays with all her neighbors
on the first graph of the sequence, namely on G1, and ac-
cumulates the payoff according to the matrix in Eq. (1).
Then the graph changes, and the agents employ the same
strategies to play with all their neighbors in the second
graph of the sequence, G2. The new payoffs are summed
to those obtained in the previous iteration. The same
procedure is then repeated n times with n such that nτ is
equal to a chosen interval ∆t, which is the strategy update
interval. At this point, the playing stage terminates and
agent strategies are updated following the Fermi update
in Eq. (2). After the agents have updated their strategy,
their payoff is reset to 0 and they start another round,
5FIG. 3. (Color online). Cooperation diagrams for the INFOCOM data set. Fraction of cooperators at the equilibrium as
a function of the temptation to defect (T) and of the sucker’s score (S) for different values of the interval ∆t between two
successive strategy updates. From left to right, the diagrams correspond to ∆t equal to 4 minutes, 10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1
hour, 2 hours, 8 hours, 10 hours, and Mτ ' 4 days. The top, middle, and bottom row report, respectively, the results for the
original data set, the reshuffled time-varying graph, and synthetic graphs constructed through the activity-driven model. The
results are averaged over 50 different realizations. Red (light gray) corresponds to 100% of cooperators, while blue (dark gray)
indicates 100% defectors. As in Fig. 2, the comparison of the diagrams corresponding to the same update interval shows that
differences appear in the region that separates the full cooperation and full defection phases and that these differences favor
(in terms of degree of cooperation) the randomized and synthetic sequences. See Fig. 9 for additional details.
during the subsequent time interval of length ∆t = nτ ,
as described above.
To evaluate the degree of cooperation obtained for a
given value of the strategy update interval ∆t and a pair
of values (T, S), we compute the average fraction of co-
operators 〈C(T, S)∆t〉:
〈C(T, S)∆t〉 = 1
Q
Q∑
i=1
N ic
N
, (3)
where N ic is the number of cooperators found at time
i∆t and Q is the total number of rounds played. In
general, we set Q large enough to guarantee that the
system reaches a stationary state in which the level of
cooperation remains roughly constant.
We have simulated the system using different values of
∆t. Notice that for smaller value of ∆t, the time scale
of the strategy update is comparable with that of the
graph evolution, while when ∆t is equal to the entire ob-
servation period Mτ the game is effectively played on a
static topology, namely the weighted aggregated graph
corresponding to the whole observation interval. We fo-
cus now on the top panels of Figs. 2 and 3, where we
show how the average fraction of cooperators depends
on the parameters S and T and on the length ∆t of the
strategy update interval. We considered six values of ∆t
for the MIT data set, from ∆t = 1 hour up to the whole
observation interval, and eight values for INFOCOM’06,
ranging from minutes up to the aggregate network.
At first glance, we notice that the rightmost diagrams
in both figures, which correspond to ∆t = Mτ , are in
perfect agreement with the results of evolutionary games
played on static topologies reported in the literature (see,
e.g., [18, 26]). If we look at the cooperation diagrams
obtained by increasing the value of ∆t in the original
sequences of graphs (top panels of Figs. 2 and 3), we no-
tice an increase of the area of the red region, which cor-
responds to configurations in which 100% of the nodes
are cooperators at the stationary state. In particular, for
MIT Reality Mining (Fig. 2), the fraction of cooperators
increases up until ∆t = 2 months, after which the coop-
eration diagram is practically indistinguishable from that
obtained on the static aggregated graph.
As we pointed out above, edge activation patterns show
non-trivial correlations. To highlight the effects of tem-
poral correlations and of periodicity in the appearance
of links in the real data sets, we have simulated the
games also on randomized time-varying graphs and on
synthetic networks generated through the activity-driven
model [60] (See Appendix B for details on the activity-
driven model). The results for randomized graphs and
activity-driven graphs are reported, respectively, in the
middle and in bottom panels of Figs. 2 and 3.
Randomized time-varying graphs are obtained by uni-
formly reshuffling the original sequences of snapshots. In
this case, the frequency of each pairwise contact is pre-
served equal to that of the original data set. However, the
temporal correlations of these contacts, namely the per-
sistence of an edge during consecutive time snapshots,
are completely wiped out. As expected, for ∆t = Mτ
the cooperation diagrams obtained on the reshuffled se-
quences (middle rightmost panels of Figs. 2 and 3) are
6identical to those obtained on the corresponding original
data sets (top rightmost panels). In fact, when ∆t = Mτ
each agent plays with all the contacts she has seen in
the whole observation interval, with the corresponding
weights, before updating her strategy, and thus the fre-
quencies of contacts are the only ingredients responsible
for the emergence of cooperation. Conversely, for smaller
values of ∆t, the importance of the temporal correlations
of each pairwise contact becomes clear since the cooper-
ation diagrams for randomized and original networks are
very different in both data sets. In fact, for the random-
ized graphs, the cooperation levels at ∆t = 1 week and
∆t = 2 hours for the Reality and INFOCOM data sets,
respectively, are comparable to those for ∆t = Mτ . This
points out that cooperation is enhanced by destroying
the temporal correlations of pairwise contacts.
Little differences are observed between activity-driven
synthetic networks and the corresponding graph sequence
randomizations (results shown in the bottom panels of
Figs. 2 and 3). In this case not only are temporal cor-
relations wiped out, but also the microscopic structure
of each snapshot is replaced by a graph having a simi-
lar density of links. This rewiring distributes links more
heterogeneously than in the original and the randomized
sequences (see Appendix B for details). The cooperation
diagrams of activity-driven networks show a further in-
crease of the cooperation levels for even smaller values of
the strategy update interval, ∆t, than in the case of Ran-
dom graphs. Namely, for ∆t = 1 day in Reality Mining
(Fig. 2) and for ∆t = 30 minutes in INFOCOM (Fig. 3),
we already recover the cooperation levels of ∆t = Mτ .
These results indicate that defectors take advantage of
the volatility of edges, and that cooperation emerges only
when the interval between two consecutive strategy up-
dates is large enough. A more detailed visualization of
the differences between the phase diagrams obtained in
the original sequence for different values of ∆t and those
observed for the randomized and synthetic networks is
reported in Figs. 8 and 9.
B. Structural analysis of time varying networks
The reported results suggest that the ordering, per-
sistence, and distribution of edges over consecutive time
windows are all fundamental ingredients for the success
of cooperation. In general, a small value of ∆t in the
original data sets corresponds to playing the game on
a sparse graph, possibly comprising a number of small
components, in which nodes are connected to a small
neighborhood that persists rather unaltered over consec-
utive time windows. The small size of the isolated clus-
ters and the persistence of the connections within them
allow defectors to spread their strategy efficiently. In the
following, we will test this hypothesis by characterizing
the structure of the original and randomized versions of
the time-varying graphs.
In order to investigate the dependence of cooperation
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FIG. 4. (Color online). Cooperation level and size of the
Giant Component. Overall cooperation level Ctot(∆t) and
average size of the giant component 〈S〉 as a function of the
aggregation interval ∆t for MIT Reality Mining (top panels)
and INFOCOM’06 (bottom panels). Blue circles correspond
to the original data, black squares to the reshuffled networks
and red triangles to the activity-driven model. The shades
indicate the standard deviation of 〈S〉 across the sequence of
graphs for each value of ∆t. Notice that the typical size of the
giant component at time-scale ∆t correlates quite well with
the observed cooperation level at the same time-scale.
on the strategy update interval ∆t, we computed the av-
erage fraction 〈S〉 of nodes in the giant component of
the graphs as a function of ∆t for the original data sets
and for the reshuffled and synthetic sequences of snap-
shots. The results reported in Fig. 4 indicate that for a
given value of ∆t, the giant component of graphs in the
randomized sequences or in the activity-driven model is
larger than that of graphs in the original ordering. The
lack of temporal correlations between consecutive time
snapshots in randomized and activity-driven networks
produces an increase in the number of ties between differ-
ent agents of the population even for small values of ∆t.
In addition, the more homogeneous distribution of links
within the snapshots of the activity-driven network fur-
ther increases the mixing of the agents and thus enlarges
the size of the giant connected component compared to
that of randomized graphs.
In Fig. 4, we also show the overall level of coopera-
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FIG. 5. (Color online). Extremal temporal clustering γie as
a function of the strategy update interval ∆t on real data
sets (blue dots). Top (bottom) panel refers to Reality Mining
(INFOCOM). Black squares correspond to randomly reshuf-
fled sequences and red triangles to activity-driven synthetic
networks. In both data sets we notice that, for small values
of ∆t, real data display an higher value of clustering (persis-
tence) than synthetic cases followed by a transition value of
∆t above which we observe a rapid increase in the clustering
of synthetic cases such that the previous situation is inverted.
tion observed at a given aggregation scale ∆t, Ctot(∆t),
defined as:
Ctot(∆t) =
1
Ctot(Mτ)
∫ 2
0
dT
∫ 1
−1
C(T, S) dS .
Notice that Ctot(∆t) is divided by the value Ctot(Mτ)
corresponding to the whole observation interval, so that
Ctot ∈ [0, 1]. The value of ∆t at which 〈S〉 is comparable
with the number of nodes N , i.e. when 〈S〉 ' 1, coincides
with the value of ∆t at which the cooperation diagram
becomes indistinguishable from that obtained for the ag-
gregate network, Ctot(∆t) ' 1, for both the original and
the reshuffled sequences of snapshots. This result con-
firms that the size of the giant connected component of
the graph corresponding to a given aggregation interval
plays a central role in determining the level of cooper-
ation sustainable by the system, in agreement with the
experiments discussed in [61] for the case of static com-
plex networks.
We also investigate the role of edge correlations be-
FIG. 6. (Color online). Evolution of cooperation and topolog-
ical quantities as a function of time t for the INFOCOM data
set in the Harmony Game (T = 0.9, S = 0.2). From top to
bottom we display the number of components Z, fraction of
nodes in the giant component S, number of links K, topolog-
ical clustering coefficient c, and fraction of cooperators C as a
function of time. Black (red or gray in b/w) line corresponds
to the original (randomized) data set.
tween consecutive graphs on the observed cooperation
level. To this aim, we analyze the temporal clustering
γie (see Appendix C), which captures the average ten-
dency of edges to persist over time. In Fig. 5 we plot
the evolution of the temporal clustering as a function of
the strategy update interval ∆t. The results clearly re-
veal that, for small values ∆t, the persistence of ties in
the two original data sets is larger than in the random-
ized and the activity-driven graphs. Overall, for small
∆t, the large temporal clustering and the small average
size of the giant component indicate that the graphs are
composed of small clusters of nodes whose composition
changes very slowly compared to the faster mixing ob-
served in the randomized sequences. Thus, these are two
ingredients hindering the cooperation levels in the orig-
inal data sets: the size of the giant component, and the
internal arrangement of connections within the different
components.
As an example of the negative effect on cooperation
of the combination of the two latter ingredients, we con-
sider a pair of (T, S) values in the Harmony Game (HG)
regime (0 < T < 1 and 0 < S < 1). The evolution-
ary dynamics of the HG in the well mixed (all-to-all)
regime drives the system towards full cooperation. Even
though this regime is the best scenario for the promo-
tion of cooperation, the real time varying graphs exhibit
small cooperation levels for small ∆t. This is mainly due
to the high level of segregation of interactions in discon-
nected and small clusters. Under these conditions (far
from the well mixed hypothesis), the HG behaves dif-
ferently in the regimes T < S and S < T (these two
regimes are separated by the solid line S = T in the pan-
8els of Figs. 2 and 3). While in the first regime, T < S,
the pairwise encounters between a cooperator and a de-
fector yield more benefit to the former, this is not the
case when S < T . Thus, when the population is seg-
regated into small (and persistent) clusters containing a
small number of nodes, defection easily prevails in the
region S < T of the HG. This counterintuitive result is
obtained for the original time varying graphs (especially
for that of MIT) and small ∆t. The time evolution of
the interaction patterns of the real data sets confirms
the structural roots of this behavior.
In Fig. 6 we display, for the case of INFOCOM, the
number of components Z, the number of links K, the size
of the giant component S, and the topological clustering
coefficient c (i.e. the probability that two neighbors of
a given node are also connected) as a function of time t.
Similar results are obtained for the MIT data set. We no-
tice considerable differences between the time evolution
of these quantities in the original time series and in the
randomized ones. Namely, in the original time-varying
graph we observe a long initial time window during which
the real network displays a large number of components
and poor connectivity. This period is then followed by
another long period characterized by the appearance of a
connected and clustered giant component. As expected,
the randomized graph does not show this persistent be-
havior. In the bottom panel, we show the evolution of
cooperation when the update interval is set to its mini-
mum value, ∆t = 4 minutes. As can be observed, starting
at time 0 would imply that the initial fraction of cooper-
ators face a rather complicated scenario for their survival
even in the HG regime.
Turning our attention back to Fig. 5, we notice that, as
∆t increases, the link persistence grows similarly in the
randomized and activity-driven networks. This growth
points out that the randomization of snapshots in one
null model and the redistribution of links in the other one
make the ties more stable as ∆t increases. This stabiliza-
tion, however, does not lead to a decrease in cooperation
since it is combined with the fast increase with ∆t of the
size of the giant component.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Although the impact of network topology on the on-
set and persistence of cooperation has been extensively
studied in recent years, the recent availability of data
sets with time-resolved information about social interac-
tions allows for a deeper investigation of the impact of
time-evolving social structures on evolutionary dynam-
ics. Here we addressed two crucial questions: does the
interplay between the time scale associated with graph
evolution and that corresponding to the strategy update
affect the classical results about the enhancement of co-
operation driven by network reciprocity? And what is the
role of the time correlations of temporal networks in the
evolution of cooperation? The importance of the com-
petition between the time scale of social ties and their
corresponding outcome (here the games played and the
benefits obtained) and the update of strategies have been
recently addressed [62, 63]. However, in our work we at-
tempted to go one step further by relying on two em-
pirical data sets incorporating the two ingredients whose
impact over the evolution of cooperation we want to eval-
uate: the time scale of social interactions and their tem-
poral correlations.
Our results confirm that, for all four social dilemmas
studied in this work, cooperation is seriously hindered
when (i) agent strategy is updated too frequently with
respect to the typical time scale of agent interaction, and
(ii) realistic link temporal correlations are present. This
phenomenon is a consequence of the relatively small size
of the giant component of the graphs obtained at small
aggregation intervals. However, when the temporal se-
quence of social contacts is replaced by randomized or
synthetic time-varying networks preserving the original
activity attributes of links or nodes but breaking the orig-
inal temporal correlations, the structural patterns of the
network at a given time scale of strategy update changes
dramatically from those observed in real data. As a con-
sequence, the effects of temporal resolution over cooper-
ation are smoothed and, by breaking the real temporal
correlations of social contacts, cooperation can emerge
and persist even for moderately small time periods be-
tween consecutive strategy updates.
Our findings suggest that the frequency at which the
connectivity of a given system is sampled has to be care-
fully chosen, according with the typical time scale of the
social interaction dynamics. For instance, as stock bro-
kers might decide to change strategy after just a couple
of interactions, other processes such as trust formation in
business or collaboration networks are likely to be better
described as the result of multiple subsequent interac-
tions. These conclusions are also supported by the re-
sults of a recent paper by Ribeiro et al. [53] in which
the effects of temporal aggregation interval ∆t in the
behavior of random walks are studied. One limitation
of the current work comes from the fact that the used
data sets have not been specifically collected in order to
study cooperation spreading on networks and might rep-
resent therefore a suboptimal network substrate for the
dynamical process under study. At the same time, these
empirical data sets arguably contain the most direct mea-
surement of human interaction upon which any social in-
teraction mechanism is then built up and –already at this
simple level of face-to-face interaction– contain rich and
non-trivial structures and phenomena. One example of
this is the fundamental role played by the real-data time
correlations in dynamical processes on the graph, which
calls for more models of temporal networks and for a bet-
ter understanding of their nature. In a nutshell, our re-
sults point out that one should always bear in mind that
both the over- and the under-sampling of time-evolving
social graph and the use of the finest/coarsest temporal
resolution could substantially bias the results of a game-
9theoretic model defined on the corresponding network.
These results pave the way to a more detailed investiga-
tion of social dilemmas in systems where both structural
and temporal correlations are incorporated in the inter-
action maps.
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Appendix A: Data sets Description
In the following, we introduce the principal character-
istics of the two data sets used in our study. As stated in
the main text, one of the reasons behind the emergence of
cooperation is the persistence of interactions. A way to
gauge such persistence is measuring the autocorrelation
function R of our time series as shown in Fig. 7.
1. MIT Reality Mining data set
The data set describes proximity interactions collected
through the use of Bluetooth-enabled phones [29]. The
phones were distributed to a group of 100 users, com-
posed by 75 MIT Media Laboratory students and 25 fac-
ulty members. Each device had a unique tag and was
able to detect the presence and identity of other devices
within a range of 5–10 meters. The interactions, intended
as proximity of devices, were recorded over a period of
about six months. In addition to the interaction data, the
original data set included also information regarding call
logs, other Bluetooth devices within detection range, the
cell tower to which the phones were connected, and infor-
mation about phone usage and status. Here, we consider
only the contact network data, ignoring any other con-
textual metadata. The resulting time-varying network is
an ordered sequence of 41291 graphs, each having N=100
nodes. Each graph corresponds to a proximity scan taken
every 5 minutes. An edge between two nodes indicates
that the two corresponding devices were within detec-
tion range of each other during that interval. We refer to
such links as active. During the entire recorded period,
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FIG. 7. (Color online). Autocorrelation fucntion R for edge
activations, averaged over all the active edges in the data
sets, Reality (top) and INFOCOM (bottom). The long lasting
correlations in the edge activity of both data sets (up to 6-
8 hours for Reality and 3-4 hours for INFOCOM) represent
one of the main ingredients behind the different cooperation
outcomes. Red (gray) line corresponds to the exponential fit
of the data.
2114 different edges have been detected as active, at least
once. This corresponds to the aggregate graph having a
large average node degree 〈k〉 ' 42. However, this is an
artefact of the aggregation; the single snapshots tend to
be very sparse, usually containing between 100 and 200
active edges.
2. INFOCOM’06 data set
The data set consists of proximity measurements col-
lected during the IEEE INFOCOM’06 conference held in
a hotel in Barcelona in 2006 [30]. A sample of 78 par-
ticipants from a range of different companies and insti-
tutions were chosen and equipped with a portable Blue-
tooth device, Intel iMote, able to detect similar devices
nearby. Area “inquiries” were performed by the devices
every 2 minutes, with a random delay or anticipation of
20 seconds. The delay/anticipation mechanism was im-
plemented in order to avoid synchronous measurements,
because, while actively sweeping the area, devices could
not be detected by other devices. A total number of 2730
distinct edges were recorded as active at least once in the
10
observation interval, while the number of edges active at
a given time is significantly lower, varying between 0 and
200, depending on the time of the day.
Appendix B: Activity-driven model
The activity-driven model, introduced in Ref. [60], is
a simple model to generate time-varying graphs start-
ing from the empirical observation of the activity of each
node, in terms of number of contacts established per unit
time. Given a characteristic time-window ∆t, one mea-
sures the activity potential xi of each agent i, defined as
the total number of interactions (edges) established by i
in a time-window of length ∆t divided by the total num-
ber of interactions established on average by all agents in
the same time interval. Then, each agent is assigned an
activity ai = ηxi, which is the probability per unit time
to create a new connection or contact with any another
agent j. The coefficient η is a rescaling factor, whose
value is appropriately set in order to ensure that the to-
tal number of active nodes per unit time in the system is
equal to η〈x〉N , where N is the total number of agents.
Notice that η effectively determines the average number
of connections in a temporal snapshot whose length cor-
responds to the resolution of the original data set.
The model works as follows. At each time t the graph
Gt starts with N disconnected nodes. Then, each node
i becomes active with probability ai∆t and connects to
m other randomly selected nodes. At the following time-
step, all the connections in Gt are deleted, and a new
snapshot is sampled.
Notice that time-varying graphs constructed through
the activity-driven model preserve the average degree
of nodes in each snapshot, but impose that connections
have, on average, a duration equal to ∆t, effectively re-
moving any temporal correlation among edges.
For the networks studied, we obtain mean raw activ-
ities 〈x〉Infocom ' 0.49 and 〈x〉Reality ' 0.15. Choosing
a number m = 2 of new links created for every acti-
vated node and constraining the average fraction of active
nodes and the average number of contacts per node to be
those of the real networks, we obtain ηReality ' 0.024 and
ηInfocom ' 0.7. Finally, the average activity of nodes
becomes 〈a〉Reality = 0.004 ± 0.001 and 〈a〉Infocom =
0.35± 0.11.
The aggregated versions of networks obtained from the
activity-driven model were computed in two steps: i)
a synthetic temporal network was created at the same
temporal resolution and of the same length as the original
data set; ii) the synthetic network was aggregated on
the appropriate time-window. This was done in order
to mimic as closely as possible the procedure that we
performed on the real networks, where a single temporal
network was compared with its own aggregated versions.
Appendix C: Temporal clustering
Several metrics have been lately proposed to measure
the tendency of the edges of a time-varying graph to
persist over time. One of the most widely used is the
unweighted temporal clustering, introduced in Ref. [44],
which for a node i of a time-varying graph is defined as:
γi =
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
∑
j a
t
ija
t+1
ij√
ktik
t+1
i
, (C1)
where atij are the elements of the adjacency matrix of the
time-varying graph at snapshot t, kti is the total number
of edges incident on node i at snapshot t, and T is the
duration of the whole observation interval. Notice that
γi takes values in [0, 1]. In general, a higher value of γi
is obtained when the interactions of node i persist longer
in time, while γi tends to zero if the interactions of i are
highly volatile.
If each snapshot of the time-varying graph is a
weighted network, where the weight ωtij represents the
strength if the interaction between node i and node j at
time t, we can define a weighted version of the temporal
clustering coefficient as follows:
γiw =
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
∑
j ω
t
ijω
t+1
ij
stis
t+1
i
. (C2)
Finally, if we focus more on the persistence of inter-
action strength across subsequent network snapshots, we
can define the extremal temporal clustering as:
γie =
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
∑
j min(ω
t
ij , ω
t+1
ij )√
stis
t+1
i
, (C3)
where by considering the minimum between ωtij and ω
t+1
ij
one can distinguish between persistent interactions hav-
ing constant strength over time and those interactions
having more volatile strength. As in our case social in-
teractions are seen to be highly volatile in real data sets,
the extremal version of the temporal clustering seems to
be the best choice to unveil the persistence of social ties
at short time scales.
Appendix D: Differences in the Cooperation
Diagrams
To highlight the effects that temporal correlations be-
tween pairwise interactions have on the emergence of co-
operation, we show in this appendix the quantitative dif-
ferences among the cooperation level of the original data
sets (as displayed by the fraction of cooperators as a func-
tion of T and S) and both their randomized and activity-
driven versions. In Figs. 8 and 9 we show these differences
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FIG. 8. (Color online). Here we report with a color-code the difference between the cooperation diagram corresponding to the
original MIT Reality Mining graph sequence (top panels) and those obtained on the reshuffled (middle panels) and synthetic
networks (bottom panels), at different values of the update interval ∆t.
FIG. 9. (Color online). As in Fig.8, we report the differences between the cooperation diagram corresponding to the original
INFOCOM’06 data set and those obtained on the reshuffled (middle panels) and synthetic networks (bottom panels), at different
values of the update interval ∆t.
for the MIT Reality Mining and INFOCOM’06 graphs,
respectively.
From these two figures, it becomes clear that most
of the differences with the dynamics run on the origi-
nal time-varying graph are concentrated at the interface
between the regions in which 100% of the nodes are coop-
erators [the red (light gray) areas in the top panels] and
those where 100% of the nodes become defectors [blue
(dark gray) areas in the top panels]. Interestingly, for
both data sets these differences are more pronounced for
smaller values of ∆t and become less evident when ∆t
increases, until they almost disappear for the largest ag-
gregation interval.
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